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FOREWORD
Contrary to hopes occasionally evident in this symposium and implicit in its title,
propaganda of the serious "warmongering," "subversive," and "defamatory" varieties
is not likely soon to be subjected to strong international control, particularly in those
contexts where the need for such control is most obvious. If and when substantial
change does come, it will probably be as a token of a larger relaxation in the attitudes
of the major powers, and it will most likely take the form of a de facto slowdown of
the respective propaganda machines rather than of adoption of outright international
controls. Nevertheless, it is certainly worthwhile to consider, as our contributors have
done, what might be done to curb the worst abuses, to achieve controls in peripheral
tension spots, and to reduce even slightly the risks of a war inflamed by propaganda.
For example, there is surely some benefit to be gained by calling attention to propa-
ganda's role in escalating minor conflicts, by encouraging regional or bilateral mora-
toria on propaganda, and by making propaganda restraint a central concern of
diplomacy where conflicts are sought to be minimized. Moreover, our relative in-
ability to enforce international law principles in practice does not automatically render
their reaffirmation fruitless.
Even if the object of achieving prompt and effective propaganda control is un-
likely to be achieved, the symposium's value and interest are unimpaired, for per-
haps its most provocative aspect is the inquiry and evidence offered as to why inter-
national society is not prepared to accept, or unable to impose, limits on this convenient
but disruptive instrument of policy. The symposium is thus a fascinating case study
of the frustrating limitations of international law in dealing with issues central to
the ongoing ideological struggle.
Several of our contributors point out that propaganda directed from one nation
to another may be less dangerous, because subject to effective reply, than propaganda
designed for domestic consumption, and that government propaganda on the home
front outweighs privately generated warmongering as a threat to peace. This cir-
cumstance provides the justification for much American propaganda beamed to
countries where a government monopoly on news and opinion exists, and the con-
tinuing controversy about "managed news" in the United States government, par-
ticularly in regard to the Vietnam conflict, suggests that western democratic govern-
ments may also engage in propagandizing of a sort among their citizens. But if
control of propaganda between nations poses a serious practical problem, the idea
of regulating communications between a government and its domestic population
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seems utterly unworkable and outside the usual province of international law as well.
Thus, that type of propaganda most likely to exacerbate tensions and result in war is
least amenable to international control.
Perhaps it is paradoxical that one remedy for government monopoly or domina-
tion of news and opinion is international propaganda, sometimes even of a sort that
might be fairly characterized, from the target government's point of view at least, as
warmongering, subversive, or defamatory. One may therefore easily prefer not to
close off channels of communication that may serve to keep domestic sources of in-
formation in the target state relatively honest. By extension of this thinking, an
issue may even be raised-and is briefly-about the constitutionality of a hypothetical
United States effort to "jam" a foreign political broadcast. And a broad conclusion
seems at least possible that would keep all communication channels open, would
avoid inhibiting free expression by attempting to distinguish-except perhaps in the
most extreme and obvious cases-between truth and falsehood or between harmful
and beneficial propaganda, and would tolerate serious and admittedly dangerous
types of propaganda as a necessary concomitant of an international "marketplace of
ideas."
None of our contributors has gone so far as to argue against any propaganda
control, but it must be expected that permanent remedial action will be more
difficult because both sides of the conflict have strong motives for keeping communi-
cations uncontrolled and also some ability to rebut propaganda that is directly dam-
aging to their respective interests. Therefore, one is led to look to gradual establish-
ment of the "right of reply" as the most likely means of achieving substantial progress
in minimizing propaganda's ill effects. Such a development would have the addi-
tional advantage of not reducing-indeed of increasing-the international interchange
of ideas, and it is appropriate to at least suggest that the interests of peace might be
furthest advanced in the long run by promoting such interchange, increasing the
respect of nations for the truth, and allowing propaganda to act as a means of bringing
pressure against repressive regimes of all kinds. As an illustration to support this
argument one could claim that China would not be as great a threat to world peace
as it is today if it were less effectively insulated from western, Russian, and pro-
Chiang propaganda and that the best hope for moderation of its policies lies in
increasing contacts of a propagandistic variety.
With the exception of the contributions by Messrs. Grzybowski and Falk, the
papers that follow were presented, or were evolved from papers presented, at a
conference organized by the International Law Society of the Duke Law School in
February 1966. Law and Contemporary Problems is proud to publish this provocative
set of articles and is indebted to the student members of the Society for obtaining the
appearance of so distinguished a group of participants and for arranging for this
publication of the conference's results.
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